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This article: First, (a) re-examines the fraud exception rule in letters of 
credit transactions with specific reference to the United City Merchants v 
Royal Bank of Canada (the American Accord) and against the background of a 
recent commonwealth decision accepting nullity as a new exception; (b) 
evaluates its impact on over/under invoicing under the WTO Agreement on 
Pre-shipment Inspection of Goods in International Trade (PSI); and (c) assesses 
its implication on the IMF Agreement on Exchange Control implemented in the 
UK by the IMF Agreement Regulations 1946 made under the IMF Agreement 
Acts 1945 as amended. Secondly, it argues that the current UCP 500 is 
outmoded and inadequate to meet current needs and is therefore in need of 
urgent revision. Thirdly, it recommends, inter alia, that in accordance with the 
said commonwealth decision, fraud by third parties should be recognised by 
English law as an independent and separate nullity exception. Fourth, and 
finally, it concludes that the status-quo acts as an unwitting Crooks’ Charter 




The House of Lords delivered a landmark judgement in 1982 which did 
attract the notice it deserves but was later to have a profound effect on the letter 
of credit jurisprudence. Although there had been a number of English and 
world decisions on the subject especially in the 1970s, no case also 
demonstrates the development and reasons for over invoicing in international 
trade as did the American Accord.1 The case dealt with many aspects of letters 
* The author is grateful to Professor Roy Goode of the University of Oxford, Professor 
Charles Debattista of the University of Southampton and Professor John Carter of the 
University of Sidney for reading through earlier the draft of this article and making 
valuable comments. However the author bears ultimate responsibilities for views held 
and any short-comings herein.  
** LLB; LLM; PhD; MIEx; COMPANION NI. Bournemouth Law School, Institute of 
Business and Law, University of Bournemouth. 
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of credit, the principle means of payments in international trade. Little over a 
decade later (1994), the WTO finalised the Agreement on Preshipment 
Inspection of Goods in International Trade (PSI).2 An essential aspect of the 
PSI Agreement is prevention of double- and under invoicing. Although English 
courts are familiar with PSI and experienced in dealing with fraud exception 
and exchange control regulation cases, this was the first time all three had been 
subject of an English court decision. 
The case is important for other reasons too. First, and hitherto, courts had 
dealt with fraud committed by the sellers and/or their agents and assignees but 
not by third parties. Secondly, the case came at an opportune time when the 
international finance community was grappling with the menace of money 
laundering, documentary frauds and other white collar crimes. Thirdly, 
although earlier attempts in English courts had failed,3 there has ever-since 
been a Commonwealth decision4 that has accepted nullity as a separate and 
independent exception in addition to fraud exception.  
The aim of this article is, therefore, seven folds: First, to re-examine the 
House of Lords’ decision in the American Accord and to reassess English law 
on fraud exception. The article argues that the Court Appeal’s decision, 
reversed by the House of Lords, was the correct one. Secondly, to postulate 
                                                                                                                                 
1 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd and others v Royal bank of Canada 
(Vitrorefuerzos SA and others, third parties) [1981] 3 All ER 142 (Court of Appeal); 
and United Merchants (Investments) Ltd and others v Royal Bank of Canada and 
others [1982] 2 All ER 720 (House of Lords); for annotation of the case see The Digest 
(Annotated British, Commonwealth and European Cases), 2nd Reissue Vol 39(3) para 
5251 at pp 535-536; 
2 For the Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection of Goods in International Trade See, 
The WTO Uruguay Round Agreements, Agreement Establishing the WTO signed in 
Marrakesh, 1994, Annex 1A, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Preshipment 
Inspection.  
3 See eg the Court of Appeal case of Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebes 
GmbH and Another [2002] 1 ALL ER (Commercial) 257, CA; and Czarnikow-Rionda 
Sugar Trading Inc. v Standard Bank of London Ltd and Others [1999] 1 All ER 890 
(Commercial); Current Law Yearbook, Sweet and Maxwell Vol1999(1) para 279 p 80 
where Rix J’s approach was to look at the balance of convenience at to which innocent 
party , the confirming bank or the applicant,  would suffer most and/or irreversibly if 
the injunctions was upheld or discharged. The judge came down, heavily in support of 
the principle that the court should interpret its right intervene in cases of fraud 
restrictively and discharged the injunction; and Banco Santander SA v Bayfern Ltd 
[199] 2 All EER 18 where Langely J, having considered the American Accord at length 
took the view that once a fraud has been committed the court would intervene even if 
this meant penalising the innocent confirming bank than the fraudster. 
4  See the Singapore Supreme Court case of Beam Technologies v Standard Chartered 
Bank [2003] 1SLR 597 
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whether, if decided post WTO PSI Agreement, the decision on over-invoicing 
and under-invoicing would have been different. Thirdly, to analyse the 
significance of the American Accord decision on international efforts to combat 
money laundering and other documentary crimes in international trade law in 
the wake of recent upsurges in that practice, without which, the article suggests 
that the UCP 500 generally and the American Accord, in particular would be 
crooks’ charters. Fourth, to demonstrate that decisions before and after the 
American Accord were motivated by policy rather than purely legal 
considerations.  Fifth, to re-examine the fraud exception principle and to put 
forward new suggestions that, as a matter of common law, courts should 
include nullity exception to cover fraud committed by third parties with or 
without the knowledge of sellers and/or beneficiaries. Sixth, to recommend 
amendments to the next revision of the UCP to include, inter alia, provisions 
on nullity or any fraud and/or related exceptions, arbitration and applicable law 
clauses so as to balance the interests of all parties. Seventh, and finally, to 
provide an exhaustive commentary on the case, with a view to furtherance of 
knowledge, that the important American Accord decision deserves. In this 
respect the article argues that attempt was long overdue. 
The article is divided as listed below. Following the introduction and 
establishment of the foundation in Parts I and II, the main thrust of the analysis 
is contained in Parts III-V which discuss various aspects of the case and Part VI 
which envisages domestic and international implications of the decision. 
 
THE “AMERICAN ACCORD” AND THE FRAUD EXCEPTION 
 
(a) Summary of the Facts 
 
The summary of the facts in the case is that an English company sold a 
glass fibre plant to a Peruvian buyer. Payment was arranged under an 
irrevocable documentary letter of credit issued by Banco Continental SA 
(issuing bank) and confirmed by the Royal Bank of Canada at its London 
branch (the confirming bank). The credit was subject to the 1974 Revision of 
the UCP (UCP 400).5 Payment arrangements agreed between the seller and the 
buyer involved inflating (“over invoicing” or “double invoicing”) purchase 
price in order to enable the buyer to transfer and hold the proceeds in a Miami 
bank in breach of the Peruvian Exchange Control Regulations.  
The seller assigned to the appellant their rights under the credit. Payment 
under the credit was to be by sight drafts on the issuing bank against delivery 
inter alia of a full set of “on board” bills of lading evidencing shipment of the 
5 Publication No 411, now superseded by the UCP 500. The UCP were first published 
by the ICC 1933 with revised versions issued in 1951, 1962, 1974 and 1983. 
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goods on or before 15 December 1976. The actual shipment was, in fact, made 
on the American Accord instead of on the American Adventure, a day later on 
16 December 1976 and from the port of Felixstowe instead of London. The 
date of 16 December 1976 on the original bills of lading was visibly altered by 
a shipping clerk to15 December 1976. The documents were rejected by the 
confirming bank. Subsequently, the tender was withdrawn, corrections made 
and fresh bills of lading tendered, bearing notation6 to the effect that the goods 
were actually on board on 15 December. The bank still refused to honour the 
credit pleading fraud. The beneficiaries sued. 
The trial judge, Mocatta J,7 held that the bank had wrongly refused to 
honour the credit, since the fraud was not committed by or with the knowledge 
of the sellers or the beneficiaries (assignee bank) but by a third party. He 
reserved his judgment on the double invoicing (monetary transaction). The 
effect of the ruling being that the bank would have to honour the credit despite 
having knowledge of fraud. The bank appealed and the Court of Appeal,8 
Stephenson LJ, (Ackner LJ and Griffiths LJ, concurring), held (reversing the 
decision of the trial court) that the bank was entitled and in fact under an 
obligation to reject the documents if fraud was established. The court reasoned 
that if a document which was false in the sense that it was forged by a person 
other than a beneficiary could entitle the bank to refuse payment, there was no 
reason why a document in any way false to the knowledge of such a person 
should not have the same effect. The appellate ruling went against the grain of 
the then-established law that in letters of credit9 and performance bonds,10 
unless the seller is aware or fraud is proved the bank should honour its 
obligations on credit. The beneficiaries appealed to the House of Lords. 
The House of Lords,11 Diplock LJ (Russell LJ, Scarman LJ and Bridge LJ, 
concurring) reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision and reinstated in part 
Mocatta’s judgement. The House of Lords’ judgment was delivered by Diplock 
LJ, like Mocatta, an experienced commercial judge. Their Lordships held that 
the confirming bank’s duty to the seller was only vitiated if there was fraud on 
the seller’s part, and the bank remained under a duty to pay, even if the 
documents presented, although conforming on their face to the terms of the 
6 Notation is the process of certifying, normally by signature or signature a “received 
for shipment” bill of lading after the goods have been loaded or amending and re-
tendering the bill lading following a rejection of the first tender of documents. 
7 [1979] 1 Lloyds Rep 267. 
8 [1981] 2 All ER 142. 
9 Letters of Credit includes standby letters of credit where they are incorporated into the 
text of the credit as used in practice in the USA. 
10 Performance Bonds are treated the same way as bills of lading regarding the fraud 
exception. 
11 [1982] 2 All ER 720. 
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credit, nevertheless contained a statement of material fact that was not accurate 
and known to the bank. Curiously, the consequence of the decision was that the 
bank was not relieved from liability even if the documents contained a material 
representation of fact which the person issuing the documents knew to be false 
and which was intended by him to deceive persons, including the seller 
himself, who might deal in the documents thereafter.  
The case is significant in many ways in restating the common law position 
on: fraud exceptions; currency exchange controls in international trade; 
severability in contracts; equitable doctrine approach in judicial decisions; and 
more importantly role of under-invoicing and over-invoicing using letters of 
credit in international trade-the subject matters of this article. 
 
(b) On the Fraud Exception Jurisprudence 
 
(i) Autonomy of documents and credits 
 
Both the trial court and the House of Lords based their judgments for the 
claimants on the independence of the documents and therefore the credits. The 
reasoning being that “credits by their nature are separate transactions from the 
sales or other contracts on which they may be based and banks are in no way 
concerned with or bound by such contracts.”12 This is because, “In 
documentary credit operations all parties are concerned deal in documents and 
not in goods,”13 a position endorsed by Jenkins LJ in Mallas (t/a Hamza Mallas 
& Sons) v British Imex Industries Ltd14 and a case referred to in the American 
Accord ruling and in which the court ruled it was clear from the provisions15 
that the opening of a confirmed credit imposes upon a banker an absolute 
obligation to pay, irrespective of any dispute there may be between the parties 
whether the goods are up to contract or not.16  
One is not taking issue with the House of Lord’s ruling in the American 
Accord per se as it is within settled law and, as will be apparent below, there is 
rationale for such positions. The thesis of this article is, however, that courts 
have over-emphasised the independence of the credit in favour of the seller and 
other beneficiaries’ often to the detriment of the buyer and the issuing bank. 
We shall return to that later. Although conceding to case law, and authors who 
accept that position dogmatically, that there is need to balance competing 
interests of parties to the sales and credit contracts, this author begs to differ. 
12 Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits  (UCP) of the ICC 1974 
Revision , ICC Publication No 290 Art 8(a)  now Art 3 of the UCP 500. 
13 Ibid Art 8(b). 
14 [1958] 1 All ER 262, (sometimes spelt as Hamzeh Malas). 
15 Now Art 15 of the UCP 500. 
16 [1958] 2 QB 127 at 129. 
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The author is further persuaded by Hooley,17 who, after setting out the 
autonomy principle in the UCP and examining whether fraud exception applies 
to fraud in the underlying transaction, considers whether, where fraud on the 
part of the beneficiary cannot be proved, payment can be withheld by the 
confirming bank on the basis that the forged fraudulent document is a nullity. 
In the process he criticises the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Montrod 
Ltd v Grundkotter, in which the existence of a nullity exception, as accepted by 
the Singapore Supreme Court decision in Beam Technologies v Standard 
Chartered Bank,18 was rejected. The American Accord was cited extensively 
and distinguished in Beam Technologies but followed in Montrod Ltd v 
Grundkotter which denied the existence of the nullity exception under English 
common law.   
On the premise that the autonomy principle lends itself to abuse one author 
commented that, “There are many means that are available to criminal 
syndicates to launder their illegal gains. Letters of credit transactions, in my 
view, are an ideal vehicle for laundering illicit funds and have so far attracted 
little attention from the regulatory authorities. While in every other service 
provided by banks, under the anti-money laundering statutes, bankers are 
required by the law to comply with 'know your customer’ regulations, bankers 
in documentary credits department remain consistent with the documentary and 
independent principle.”19 It is, therefore, not far-fetched to suggest that the 
principle and its application as fraud exception in the American Accord, and 
authorities before and after it, provides comfort to fraudsters and is 
appropriately referred to as the Crooks Charter.  It is a further argument of this 
article that the autonomy principle neglects not only the opposing doctrine of 
strict compliance but also the interest of other innocent parties. 
 
(ii) And the Doctrine of Strict Documentary Compliance and the UCP 
 
This article further reiterates that the American Accord was at variance 
with the doctrine of strict documentary compliance applicable to the UCP and 
credit. Even if the beneficiary’s claim would have succeeded on the basis of the 
autonomy principle, it is submitted that it should still have failed on the 
doctrine of strict documentary compliance. The doctrine provides that the 
beneficiary should present the exact documents and in the terms and conditions 
required. The documents must conform strictly to the terms of the credit; and 
17 Hooley, RJA, Fraud and Letters of Credit: Part 1- Butterworth Journal of 
International Banking Law & Finance (BJ I B&F), 2003, Vol 18 No 3 pp 91-98; see 
also [2002] CLJ 281. 
18  [2003] 1 SLR 597. 
19 Anonymous Author, “Money laundering and documentary credit transactions”,  
Journal of Money Laundering Control,  2002, Vol 5 No 3 p 217. 
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“there is no room for documents which are almost the same or which will do 
just as well.”20 Only then should we move to the point that if the documents 
conform with the terms of the credit, the banker is not concerned as to whether 
the documents stipulated by the  buyer serve any useful commercial  purpose or 
as to why the customer called for tender of a document or a particular 
description21 or as to the legal effect of the document or vis a vis the 
applicant.22  It forms no part of the bank’s function, when considering whether 
to pay against the documents presented to it, to speculate about the underlying 
facts.23 Neither should the bank question the usefulness or sufficiency of the 
documents.24  
Nevertheless, as in the American Accord, where the credit calls for 
shipping documents, they must conform to customary shipping documents as to 
be reasonably fit to pass current in commerce. Even given that the requirements 
of strictly compliance are slightly different, the American Accord tender was 
still an improper and un-conforming tender. The bill of lading had a wrong 
shipping date, it was deliberately altered, almost same as forged, and the 
issuing bank, the seller and the beneficiaries were all aware of it. The tender 
and acceptance of forged documents in this case went against the grain of 
established and accepted case law that a tender of documents which, properly 
read and understood, call for further inquiry or are such as to invite litigation is 
clearly a bad tender.25 Accordingly a beneficiary who presents fraudulent 
documents has not complied with the requirement and should therefore fail. 
This was not a tender in the legal sense of the term. The beneficiary failed to do 
so in the present case and should not have succeeded. 
 
(iii) Effect Fraud on the bank’s guarantee under the credits. 
 
It is argued that fraud from whatever source should nullify the guarantee 
provided by the bank guarantee.26 Instead the American Accord simply stuck to 
20 Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners (1926) 27 Ll LRep 49 at p 52, 
per Lord Sumner. 
21  Kydon Compania Naviera SA v National Westminster Bank [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 68 
at 75. 
22 British Imex Industries Ltd v Midlands Bank Ltd [1958] 1 All ER 264, which was 
cited in the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
23 Westpac Banking Corporation and Commonwealth Steel Co. Ltd v South Carolina 
National Bank [1986] 1 Lloyds Rep 311 at 315, PC. 
24  See Article 15 of the UCP.   
25 See Hansson v Hemel and Horley Ltd [1922] 2 AC 36 at 46, and M.Golodetz & Co 
Inc v Czarnikow-Rionda Co Inc (The Galatia) [1979] 2 All ER 726 at 739-740, per 
Donaldson J(affirmed [1980] 1 All ER 501). 
26 For liability of forged documents and for the scope of the fraud\ exception, see 
Halsbury’ Laws of England, Vol 3 (1), 4th edn, paras 286 and 289. 
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the hitherto common law and international commercial principles on fraud 
exception in credits and performance bond 27transactions, namely that unless 
the bank is aware or has knowledge of the fraud it will pay on the letter of 
credit. But it was conceded that the bank was both aware and had knowledge. 
The modern origin of this principle is the American case of Edward Sztejn v J 
Henry Schroder Banking Corporation,28 cited and referred to in the American 
Accord judgment and which has been followed by English judges in such 
landmark decisions as Bank Russo-Iran v Gordon Woodroffe & Co Ltd,29 R 
Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd,30 and Edward 
Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International.31 In Edward Owen 
Engineering, Geoffrey Lane LJ summarised the position thus: “The only 
circumstances which would justify the bank not complying with a demand 
made under that agreement would be those which would exonerate them under 
similar circumstances if they had entered into a letter of credit, and that is this, 
if it had been clear and obvious to the bank that the buyers had been guilty of 
the offence.”32  
 On this point, once again, one has no basic quarrels with Lane LJ’s 
decision as it simply restated accepted law. It is submitted, however, that in the 
American Accord, both the trial court and the House of Lords got it wrong in 
allowing the payment and the Court of Appeal was correct in rejecting the 
payment for the reasons given above. The trial court and the House of Lords 
limited their interpretation of the fraud exception only to when it emanates 
from the seller or his agent. When there is fraud from third party sources, as in 
this case, the courts having accepted that they were in new territory should 
have been flexible, bold and prepared to distinguish earlier authorities and to 
break new grounds as the Singapore Court was to do later in Beams 
Technologies. 
 Secondly, English courts were not prepared to exercise judicial oversight 
by considering other issues, such as the surrounding circumstances and their 
overall effect of the case. In this the courts are not alone; most academic 
authors tend to peddle that common ground. This author, with due respect, begs 
to differ. In addition to Hooley33 other authors such as Chin LY and Wang YK 
27 Performance bonds are treated the same way as letters of credit with  regard to fraud, 
see generally, Quentin Loh mad Tang Hang Wu “ Injunctions Restricting Calls on 
Performance Bonds-Is fraud the only ground in Singapore?”, Lloyds Maritime & 
Commercial Law Quarterly, 2000, 348-363. 
28 (1941) 31 NYS 2n 631. 
29 (1972) Transcript, The Times, October 4. 
30 [1977] 2 All ER 862 at 870 per Kerr J. 
31 [1978] 1 All ER 976. 
32 [1978] 1 All ER 976 at 986 per Lord Denning MR. 
33  See, Note 17, supra. 
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who34 take the same position in their analysis of the Singapore court decision 
in Beam Technologies on whether a bank could refuse to pay on a documentary 
credit, even though the beneficiary presenting the documents was not guilty of 
fraud, because the documents were forgeries perpetrated by a third party. They 
also review case law on the autonomy of documentary credits and examine the 
implications for international trade if the Commonwealth jurisdictions followed 
the Singaporean ruling and allowed an exception to the autonomy principle, 
based on the nullity of the documents. Having followed the American decision 
on Sztejn it is hoped they will do likewise with a common law decision.  
That leads to the issue of fraud committed by the seller or his agent.   
 
(iv) Fraud committed by the seller or his agent  
 
The American Accord and other cases on the subject suggest for the buyer 
and his bank to succeed they have to prove that the fraud has been committed 
by either the seller or his agent or any one else instructed by him. Although the 
contrary view was not argued before them the trial court and the House of 
Lords limited themselves only to fraud committed by the seller or his agent. 
They were not prepared to look at fraud, although committed by a third party, 
affecting the whole transaction. Instead they preferred not to express any 
opinions and to leave the matter open.35 Although the seller and the assignee in 
the American Accord were not parties to the fraud they nevertheless benefited 
from it. That in itself should not be a consideration, nevertheless where as in 
this case, the seller not only knew of the first fraud (bill of lading) but also 
willingly participated in the second fraud (double-invoicing), he should not 
have been permitted to benefit. The seller was not entirely innocent in this 
respect. They went along with the buyer’s scheme of using the credit for 
purposes other than paying for goods bought and shipped. 
It is submitted that in such cases, the House of Lords, like the Court of 
Appeal should have been prepared to look at the whole transaction. Fraud is 
fraud and it makes no difference who in the credit chain perpetrates it. After all 
34 Chin LY and Wang YK, “Autonomy-a Nullity at last?” LM&CLQ (2004) No1 
February pp 14-19; see also Quentin Loh and Tang Hang Wu, “Injunctions Restraining 
Calls on Performance Bonds- Is fraud the only ground in Singapore?” LM & CLQ 
(2000) pp 348-363. 
35 Hence Lane LJ’s statement, “ There is I think it is conceded, no authority , English or 
American , directly deciding that the fraud of a third party  such as the maker of a false 
document is or is not a good defence to a claim to be paid in accordance with the terms 
of a letter of credit. Most of these cases of fraud are, as is to be expected, cases of fraud 
by a seller hoping to be paid for rubbish or, at the least, defective goods before the true 
state of affairs are known which his own misdescription has concealed.” [1981] 3 All 
ER 142 at 161. 
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the bank is at risk regardless of who commits the fraud. Where it fails the 
beneficiary the bank is normally penalised, why shouldn’t the seller be 
penalised when it fails the bank? The bank takes on this onerous duty on the 
basis that others will perform their duties and do so honestly. The seller and the 
beneficiary fell short on this occasion, and in failing to recognise, these courts 
too failed in their responsibilities to protect all parties to the contract. 
All cases cited before the court dealt with fraud on the seller’s part and 
included cases where no goods were delivered at all. Previous decisions did not 
make distinctions between the frauds. The American Accord was however 
different from that scenario and should have been distinguishable: it involved 
fraud from and by a third party. Having conceded (see below) that there were 
no authorities for fraud other than that committed by the seller, the courts 
should have been free to act independently rather than feeling bound by 
distinguishable precedence. They (trial court and House of Lords) should have 
considered that what matters is the existence and effect of the fraud irrespective 
of source. They should also have borne in mind that once the seller benefits 
(even if they are not party to the fraud) that is what counts. For those reasons 
courts should extend the exception to fraud if committed by third parties with 
or without the seller’s knowledge and/or consent. Hence the nullity exception. 
 
(v) Fraud committed by a third party with or without sellers or beneficiary’s 
knowledge-the Nullity Exception. 
 
In the American Accord, fraud was committed by a third party without the 
seller or assignees knowledge. The trial court and the House of Lords were 
heavily influenced by that fact, hence Stephenson LJ’s statement that; 
 
“There is, I think conceded, no authority, English or American, 
directly deciding that the fraud of a third party such as the 
maker of a false document is or is not a good defence to a 
claim to be paid in accordance with the terms of a letter of 
credit. Most of the cases of fraud are, as is to be expected, 
cases of fraud by the seller hoping to be paid for rubbish or, at 
the least, defective goods before the true state of affairs which  
his own description has concealed. It is in the context of such 
facts that Bailhache J’s statement about description, fraudulent 
or (where the buyer had rejected the goods before payment by 
the bank) innocent, in Society Metallurgique  d’ Audbrives & 
Villerupt  v British Bank for Foreign Trade36  and the 
36 (1922) 11 Ll  L Rep 168 at 170. 
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statements quoted from Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v 
Barclays Bank have to be considered.”37  
 
Secondly, the two courts were influenced by the fact that the fraud was 
committed unknown to the sellers or beneficiaries. However, as has been 
constantly argued, as far as credit dealings are concerned it should not make 
any difference who commits the fraud. What matters is that fraud is committed 
and that when presented for payment the documents do not conform. Unless 
this position is adopted the process puts the banks in jeopardy and makes a 
mockery of the system. If they do not pay they are crucified by the beneficiary 
and the courts. If they do pay despite the fraud they are crucified by the buyer 
and his banks (issuing, corresponding, confirming and paying). Tails they lose 
heads they do not win.  
Most academic authors cited by the Court of Appeal such as Davis,38 
Gutteridge and Megrah39 and Benjamin40 tend to follow the status quo. To this 
should be added the American Accord, Montrode, Equitable Trust and 
Dawson, Gian Singh & Co Ltd v Banque de L’Indochine41 and related 
decisions for the status quo.  The only exceptions are Hooley above who give 
clear support to the exception including the fraud of third party and Goode42  
who disputes the protection accorded holders in due course such as in the 
American Accord and criticised Mocatta J’s decision for holding that the 
loading supervisor’s fraud did not defeat their claim. Goode also cites the 
American case of United Technologies Corporation v Citibank N A43 (one of 
the cases which applied New York’s UCC), for his position. This club of 
‘dissenters’ include Chin and Wang.44 To this should be added Justice Chao 
37 [1981] 1 All ER 142 at 161. 
38 The Law Relating to Commercial Letters of Credit, 3rd, Edn,1963, pp 145-1460], 
Gutteridge and Megrah [Laws of  Bankers Commercial Credits 6th Edn, 1979, p 137. 
39 Laws of Bankers commercial Credits,  6th Edn, 1979, p137. 
40 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods [ 1974, para 2074, p 1060]40
41 [1972-1974] SLR 16 and [1974] 2 All ER 754 PC. 
42 Goode, Roy M, “Reflections on Letters of credit -1 [1980] JBL 291; Professor 
Goode’s article was cited by Stephenson LJ in the Court of Appeal and seems to have 
influenced the court on the point that a fraudulent bill of lading does not become a 
conforming document merely because the fraud is that of a third party. With respect the 
real point is whether under UCP such falsity prevents apparently conforming 
documents from being accepted in such circumstances. The House of Lord in reversing 
the Court of Appeal’s decision thought not; similar views are held in his book his book 
Commercial Law, 2nd edn  (1995), 1008-1009. 
43  (1979) 469 F Supp 473. 
44 See Note 32, supra. 
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Hick Tin, who broke ranks by allowing the nullity exception in Beam 
Technologies.45
  It had also been suggested by others including Schmithorff46 a decade 
before UCP 500 that it would be desirable that the next revision of the UCP 
should expressly authorise banks to refuse to honour a credit if fraud is 
established irrespective of whether the seller is party to the fraud. The next 
UCP [UCP 500] did not heed that advice. Instead the ICC stuck to cases “of 
which the bank is aware and/or has knowledge or where fraud is proven.” The 
chorus for revision of the UCP has recently received a boost from Ellinger.47
 
(vi) Banks predicaments credit transactions involving or alleging fraud 
 
This author, and others in the ‘club of the unwilling’, has consistently 
maintained that it is immaterial who commits the fraud, and that what matters 
is that the bank or seller/beneficiary has knowledge as was so in the American 
Accord. The guiding principle is “of which the bank is aware and/or has 
knowledge.” But what constitutes knowledge and/or its extent? Courts do not 
seem to provide any guidelines. However, as one commentator on the role of 
credits in money laundering put it, bankers handling letters of credit 
transactions need to bear in mind that “ the legislative history of the money 
laundering statutes makes clear that knowledge includes the concepts of ‘wilful 
blindness’, ‘deliberate ignorance’, and ‘conscience avoidance’. Thus, if a bank 
employee suspects that someone may be money laundering ‘dirty money’ but 
deliberately refuses to ask questions or report the activity to superiors because 
he wants to remain ignorant, the employee and the bank could be deemed to 
have knowledge for purposes of assessing criminal liability.”48 Another 
45 By holding that “It is our opinion that the negotiating /confirming bank was not 
obliged to pay under the LC if it had established within the seven day period prescribed 
under art 13(b) of the UCP 500, that a material document required under the credit was 
forged and null and void, and had given notice of its refusal within that period. While 
we recognise that there could be difficulties in determining under what circumstances a 
document would be considered material or a nullity, such a question can only be 
answered on the facts of each case. One cannot generalise. It is not possible to define 
when a document is a nullity. But it is really not that much more difficult to answer 
such questions than to determine what is reasonable, an exercise which the courts are 
all too familiar with.” Beam Technologies, supra, at pp 610-611.   
46 Schmitthoff, Clive M,  [1982] JBL 319 at 321. 
47 Ellinger, E P, “The UCP -500:considering a new revision”, LM & CLQ 2004, pp 30-
45 
48 Anonymous Author, “UCP and Fraud”, supra, at p 217; as to proceeds of drug 
trafficking see Halsbury’s Laws 4th Edition, Vol 11 (1) para 408; as to the powers of 
the Financial Services Authority to make rules and to institute proceedings see 
Halsbury’s Laws, ibid, Vol 18 (1) paras 38 and 422 respectively; for the powers of the 
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commented put it rather crudely that “At the time of sharp market breaks, a 
bank officer who cannot, at his customer’s request discover some plausible 
reason for dishonouring drafts is hardly worthy of the name.”49 According to 
this position, “The more prudent approach will be, particularly where the 
bank’s own money is involved, for the bank to carry out its own inquiries to 
establish the authenticity of the documents which have been presented by the 
beneficiary.”50  
Until that revolution, the position remains that of policy of protecting the 
credit system. The role and function of the bank in the credit transaction has 
been supported by Banks LJ in a recent decision of Phillip Brothers Ltd v The 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC),51 thus, “The over-
riding interest of the Courts (is) is maintaining the strength of the letter of 
credit. To my mind, the Bank primarily takes the commercial risk. The Bank 
must decide whether the documents conform to its mandate. I would be slow to 
take that mandate away. If the bank pays it may be unable to be reimbursed. If 
it does not pay, it runs the risk that its international reputation will be injured. 
Risk taking is part of the business of the Bank.” We shall return to this 
orthodox and policy-oriented position later.52  
The American Accord also demonstrates the apparent sharp difference 
between the liberal and strict interpretations and drew the line between the 
liberal and strict approach to fraud exceptions. 
 
THE LIBERAL v THE STRICT INTERPRETATION 
 
(a) The Liberal v the Strict Judicial Approach 
 
Although the fraud exception on the part of the beneficiary seeking to avail 
himself of the credit is a clear application of the maxim “ex turpi causa non 
oritur” or, in plain English, “fraud unravels all”, the American Accord has 
exposed a number of unresolved issues. First, the trial court and the House of 
Lords should not have allowed court process and the credit to be used for other 
purposes and by dishonest merchants to carry out fraud. In this respect the case 
has shown that by adopting the strict approach English courts’ attitude towards 
fraud exception in credit transactions has not been consistent.  
 
Commissioners of Customs and Excise as to offences see Halsbury’s Laws, ibid, Vol 
12(2) para 1174; and for the Solicitors’ duty to report see Halsbury’s Laws, Ibid. Vol 
37 para 570 and Vol 44 (1) para 90. 
49 Anonymous Author, “UCP and fraud”, supra at p 218. 
50  Ibid. 
51 [1990] 1 All ER 230 (Commercial). 
52 See  Part V of this article, post. 
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Secondly, some courts, such as the Court of Appeal in this case, take a 
more liberal approach with regard to the severity of fraud required to justify an 
injunction in restraint of payment such as the view of Stephenson LJ that, 
“There was fraud in the transaction, and our courts should adopt the flexible 
standard to be applied as the circumstances of a particular situation mandate, as 
did the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) now ruling in the USA. We should 
not apply it only to situation…in which wrongdoing of the beneficiary has not 
vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate purposes of the independence 
of the issuer’s obligation would no longer be served.”53
Thirdly, others favour the more conventional “restricted” approach, as 
illustrated by Diplock LJ’s in the case. In the American Accord, despite the fact 
that a falsely dated bill of lading was presented under the credit by the 
beneficiary, because he was unaware of the falsification, the House of Lords 
felt the bill of lading was good value, presentation was not fraudulent and so 
the fraud exception did not apply. The ‘guilty’ knowledge of the seller at the 
time seems to be the only consideration in deciding whether the presentation is 
fraudulent or not.  
It is submitted that such restrictive approach although simplistic in theory 
is difficult to apply in practice. It leads to the already demonstrated dilemmas 
that this puts the banks in. On the one hand, if a bank confronted with 
fraudulent documents, refuses to pay out, it may be in breach of its obligation 
to the beneficiary if the documents were forged by a third party. On the other 
hand, if a bank honours a demand accompanied by documents which to its 
knowledge are fraudulent, it may be in breach of its obligation to its customer. 
Consequently, a bank confronted with fraudulent documents will have to work 
out who committed the fraud before it can decide whether to pay or not. Yet 
banks are supposed to assume no liability or responsibility for the form, 
sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness or legal effects of any documents.  
Furthermore, they are also not supposed to ask any questions and to deal in 
documents only and not goods.   
The American Accord also unavoidably ventured into wider issues of 
foreign exchange and international finance -the second fraud in the case- issues 
not covered by any modern English and/or common law decision.  
 
(b) Foreign Exchange Contracts v Sales’ Contracts 
 
Other than the fraud exception, the second point that the court considered 
was, therefore, whether the contract was an “exchange contract” or a “currency 
53 Cited in, Anonymous Author, “UCP and Fraud”, Journal of Money Laundering 
Control, supra, at 3. 
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transfer contract”, within the context of the Bretton Woods Agreements.54 The 
answer to this preliminary question would determine whether the seller would 
be allowed to retain the proceeds of the double invoicing involved in the 
transaction. 
 However, there were divergence of views between the Court of Appeal on 
the one hand and the trial court and the House of Lords on the other regarding 
the constitution of exchange contracts.55 By virtue of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement Order in Council 1946,56 made under the Bretton Woods Agreement 
Act 194557 to give effect to the Bretton Woods Agreement: “Exchange 
contracts which involve the currency58 of any Member59 and which are 
contrary to the exchange control regulations60 of that member61 maintained or 
imposed consistently with this Agreement62 shall be unenforceable63 in the 
territory of the member....”64  It will be apparent later that it is this aspect, 
rather than enforceability of the sales contract, that influenced their Lordships’ 
decision. 
Was the American Accord an exchange or a sales contract? In an earlier 
decision, Wilson, Smithett  & Co Ltd v Terruzi, Lord Denning said that the term 
“exchange contract” was not defined, but should be liberally construed having 
regard to the objects of the Bretton Woods Agreement to protect the currency 
54 Arising from an international conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 
July 1944 to discuss alternative proposals relating to post-war international payments’ 
problems put forward by the US, Canada and the UK governments. The Agreement  
resulting from the conference led to the establishment of the IMF and the World Bank.  
55 For Contracts under the Agreement, see Proctor, C Mann on the Legal Aspects of 
Money, supra, para 15 27 pp 385-386. 
56 For the Order in Council see the Bretton Woods Agreement Order in Council 1946, 
SI No1946/36. 
57 For the Bretton Woods Agreement Act 1945 (as repealed and replaced) see 22 
Halsbury’s Statutes (3rd edn) p 886. 
58 For the meaning of “Involve the currency”, see Proctor, C Mann on the Legal 
Aspects of Money, supra,  para, 15 29 pp 398-399. 
59 For the meaning of “Of any member” see, ibid,  para 15 30 pp 399-400. 
60 For the meaning of “And which is contrary to the exchange control regulations” see, 
ibid,  para 15 31 pp 400-402. 
61 For the meaning of “ Of that member” see, ibid,  para 15 32 p 402. 
62 For the meaning of “Maintained or imposed consistently with this agreement” see, 
ibid,  para 15 33  pp 403-405. 
63  For the meaning of “Shall be enforceable” see, ibid,  para 15 34 pp 405-407. 
64 For an early interpretation of the provision by the Board of Executives of the 
International Monetary Fund see (1945) 3 ICLQ 262; for “Exchange contracts” see 
Proctor, Charles, Mann on the Legal Aspects of Money, 6th Edn para 15 28, pp 386-
398. 
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of the states who are parties thereto. He (Lord Denning MR),65 considered that, 
“exchange contract”, meant any contracts which in anyway affected a country’s 
exchange resources.66 However, Kerr J in a detailed judgment rejected Lord 
Denning’s wider (liberal) interpretation and preferred the narrower (restrictive) 
one of Nussbaum,67 namely that “exchange contracts” are contracts to 
exchange the currency of one country for the currency of another. Interestingly, 
the Court of Appeal presided over by Lord Denning MR, affirmed Kerr J.  One 
tends to agree with Kerr in this instance that exchange contracts are purely 
monetary exchange and not sales contracts with elements of currency transfer. 
Although, Denning overruled himself in the latter case there is some sympathy 
with his interpretation in the American Accord during its passage through the 
Court of Appeal that this was an exchange contract disguised as a sales 
contract. 
Subsequently, and for some reason, the court went into detailed discussions 
on whether this was a sale of goods or sale of documents’ contracts. In so doing 
the Court relied on Kwei Tek Chao (t/a Zung Fu Co) v British Traders and 
Shippers Ltd.68 This author has expressed his views on this issue elsewhere.69 
However, by taking that root in the American Accord the Court of Appeal 
provided a red-herring and did not add much to the debate: although there is an 
overlap between the two, the main issue in Kwei Tek Chao was to do with the 
nature of the CIF rather than credit contracts.  
Also cited were analogous English post-war building contract cases and 
comparative American decisions. 
 
(c)     Comparison with English Post-war Building Construction and American 
Decisions  
 
(i) Comparisons with English Post war Building Construction Decisions 
In arriving at their decision the courts seemed to be persuaded by 
analogous previous English decisions on building construction contracts. It will 
be remembered that after the war English courts became familiar with cases in 
which builders entered into lump sum contracts to do work in excess of amount 
65 Following  Mann, FA (see Kerr J in Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd v Terruzzi [1976] 
1QB 683 at 698-699. 
66 [1967] 1QB 605, 613 G-4A. 
67 Dr Nussbaum, “Money in the Law-National ands International”, Yale LJ 421 at  p 
542 et seq. 
68 Kewi Tek Chao (trading as Zung Fu Co) v British Traders and Shippers Ltd [1954] 1 
All ER 779. 
69 See generally, Ademun-Odeke,  “CIF Contracts-Is it a Sale of Goods or Sale of 
Documents?” Journal of Contract Law, Butterworths, Sidney, Australia, Vol 6 No 2 
1993,  pp 158-176.  
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for which licences had been granted and so were in breach of Defence 
(General) Regulations 1939.70 In one such case, Jackson Stansfield & Sons 
Butterworth71 and Dennis & Co Ltd v Munn,72 the plaintiff builders recovered 
the licensed amount (by concession of the defendant building owners) but 
could not enforce the claim to the non-licensed excess. Similarly, in Frank W 
Clifford Ltd v Grath,73 the cost in excess of the limit was allowed, although 
Lord Denning LJ, doubted whether a lump sum contract, “for a single and 
indivisible work”, would not be wholly illegal and irrecoverable. But he 
concluded they could when the work was divisible into its component items.   
Similarly, Stephenson LJ saw no reason why the court should not divide it 
into its costs and concurred that the court could not be disabled from dividing it 
by its being claimed in one total; in which case it became a matter of form 
only. This was compared with a claim for an agreed rent; where the standard 
rent would be recoverable, whether or not it had been separated in the claim 
from the excess.74  This may be so under English law, but it is not clear 
whether English common law doctrinal practice should be good examples in 
international cases. Once more, one cannot see any relevance of these building 
construction cases other than for purely analogous purposes. 
 In addition, courts in the American Accord also surveyed a number of 
comparative American decisions on the subject.  
 
(ii) Comparison with American Decisions and the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC) 
 
In addition to Sztejn, courts in the American Accord referred to a number of 
other American decisions in relation to a range of issues arising from similar 
contracts. First, was Old Colony Trust Co v Lawyers’ Title and Trust Co,75 
where the court drew a distinction between a document which was inaccurate 
and a document which was false, or between a document which was false to the 
knowledge of its maker and a document which he forged. English courts did 
not “buy” that argument in the American Accord.   Secondly, was Bank of 
Taiwan v Union National Bank of Philadelphia,76 which ruled that if, “The date 
of the bills of lading did not truthfully represent the date of the beginning of the 
actual transportation would be a defence, it could constitute a defence if and 
70  SR & O 1939 No 927, reg 56A. 
71  [1948] 2 All ER 558. 
72  [1949] 1All ER 616 2KB 327. 
73  [1956] 2 All ER 323. 
74  See Schisselman v Rubin [1951] WN 530.  
75 (1924) 297 F 152. 
76 (1924) 1F 2d 65 at the Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. 
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only if the plaintiff knew that fact when it acquired the draft.”77 That case 
would be no help since the assignee in the American Accord probably did not 
know the bill of lading was inaccurate. Furthermore, in both the American 
Accord, and the Bank of Taiwan courts were protecting transferees (banks) not 
sellers. Thirdly, in Maurice O’ Meara Co v National Park Bank of New York,78 
only the dissenting judgment on a case involving a dispute between a buyer and 
seller who had misrepresented the security upon which the advance was made 
was cited. The case did not, however, throw any light on the proceedings and it 
remains unclear as to why a dissenting judgment was cited except perhaps to 
provide a link with Bank of East Asia Ltd. V Pang,79 a latter case in which the 
Washington Supreme Court preferred Maurice O’Meara. The other relevance 
of Bank of East Asia was that it was followed in the leading case of 
Continental National Bank v National City Bank of New York,80 and 
subsequently in the landmark case of Sztejn. However, those American 
decisions, especially Sztejn, are distinguishable from the American Accord in 
that sellers in those cases, by largely shipping rubbish in performance of their 
contracts, were themselves parties to the fraud.  
Fourthly, was Intraworld Industries Inc. Girard Trust Bank,81 where the 
beneficiary’s fraud was relevant to the decision.  Intraworld was followed in 
New York Life Insurance Co v Hartford National Bank and Trust Co82 by the 
Connecticut Supreme Court. Other than that, the New York Life Insurance 
decision was itself insignificant were it not for citing and following the 
important United Bank Ltd v Cambridge Sporting Goods Corporation83 
decision. However, even United Bank Ltd v Cambridge Sports Goods is 
distinguishable from the American Accord since it represents a number of 
cases, in the mould of Sztejn, in which the fraud was committed by sellers who 
shipped rubbish compared to the American Accord where: (a) contractual 
goods were shipped albeit later than stipulated, (b) the fraud was committed by 
a third party, and (c) one party with the willing participated of the other sought 
to use the credit for purposes other than for  legitimate sales transactions. It is, 
therefore, rather difficult to fathom why those American decisions were cited 
and followed by English courts in the American Accord. 
                                                     
77  Ibid at 66. 
78  (1925) 239 NY 386 Cardozo’ s. 
79  (1926) 249 P 1060. 
80  (1934) 69 F 2d 312. 
81  (1975) Pa 336 A 2d 313 (beneficiary’s fraud). 
82  (1977) 378 A 2d 562). 
83 (1976) 392 NYS 2d 265 (old unpadded, ripped and mildewed gloves instead of new 
boxing gloves). 
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Fifth, and finally, in the American Accord, the Court of Appeal cited South 
Western Shipping Corporation v National City Bank of New York84 where it 
was noted that, “all the judges of the court seem to have been of the opinion 
that the defendant bank could have relied on the rule that the court would not 
assist a party to an illegal contract to carry out this illegality object, as a 
defence  to the plaintiff’s claim in negligence and breach of contract in paying 
out to the wrong person (in fact the party to the illegal contract) money 
deposited with the defendant bank in furtherance  of a breach of Italian 
currency [exchange] regulations and art VIII s 2(b) of the Bretton Woods  
Agreement.”85 Of the above American decisions cited, this was probably the 
only one that was all in fours with the American Accord- covering all the 3 
issues: (a) fraud in credits, (b) the Bretton Woods Agreement and (c) Exchange 
Control Regulations of a Member State (Italy).  
Following that brief detour the courts in the American Accord returned to 
other common law doctrine of severance and illegal and unenforceable 
contracts presumably in order to assistance in solving problems arising from 
the altered bill of lading and over-invoicing. To determine violation the court 
had to answer a preliminary question whether the contract in the American 
Accord was predominantly an exchange contract or a sales contract. It was 
illegal and should not have been enforced by or in English courts.  
 
COMMON LAW JURISPRUDENCE ON FRAUD EXCEPTION 
 
(a) Was the Contract Illegal or Unenforceable at Common Law? 
 
(i) Whether the contract was Illegal or unenforceable 
 
The third and final consideration was as to whether the contract in the 
American Accord was illegal or simply unenforceable. Apart from the date 
alteration in the bill of lading the agreement between the buyer and the seller 
also involved an artificially inflated price in US$ and a collateral agreement by 
the seller that it would hold the excess funds as trustee to transmit to the 
buyer’s account  in Florida. This latter arrangement was held by the Court of 
Appeal to be, “a monetary transaction in disguise”, and that that part of the 
credit was therefore unenforceable. The House of Lords concurred that the 
contract was unenforceable under the 1946 IMF Agreement Order as a 
monetary transaction in disguise not as a question of construction, but one of 
looking to the substance of the transaction.86   
84  (1959) 6 NY 2d 454, 190 NY 2d 352. 
85  American Accord [1981] 3 All ER 142 at 153. 
86  See Lord Diplock’s decision [1982] 2 All ER at 730 b-d.
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In an earlier decision,87 Diplock LJ said that the Order made such a 
contract unenforceable, not illegal. Otherwise under common law illegal 
contracts are contracts which are forbidden by statute (such as the Bretton 
Woods Agreement Order in Council) in the instant case or are contrary to 
common law or public policy and are therefore generally void. Examples are 
(a) contracts tending to injure the public service,88 (b) a contract in restraint of 
trade,89 and (c) a contract to commit a criminal offence or a civil wrong.90 
Unenforceable contracts, on the other hand, are simply contracts which 
although valid cannot be enforced directly by action because of some technical 
defect, e.g., lapse of time. It is submitted that for our purposes these 
distinctions are academic; for although unenforceable contracts are not 
necessarily illegal contracts, however, the effect of the two is the same in that 
the common denominator in both is the unenforceability. The American Accord 
could not possibly fit into that category-hence the court‘s willingness to permit 
severable enforcement of the unoffending part thereof.91 It was also doubtful 
whether it would have made a difference if the contract concerned domestic 
exchange dealing and exchange control or an external foreign exchange 
regulation. 
 
(ii) The Legality of Domestic Foreign Exchange Contracts under English 
Law 
 
From cases cited in the arguments the courts took the position that 
exchange contracts between citizens and/or residents in the UK are not 
illegal.92 First, in line of these cases, was Sharif v Azad93 where the plaintiff a 
Pakistani citizen resident in the UK claimed against the defendant (another 
Pakistani citizen) also resident in England, £300 on a dishonoured cheque for 
that amount drawn by him on an English bank. The issue arose from the actions 
of one Latif, a Pakistani resident in Pakistan (but on a visit to England) to take 
rupees out of Pakistan without the permission of the Pakistan State Bank 
contrary to Pakistan currency exchange  regulations. The defendant’s defence 
87 Sharif v Azad [1967] 1QB 605, at 618 a-b. 
88 Parkinson v College of Ambulance [1925] 2KB 1 (attempted sale of public office or 
contract to procure title of honour). 
89 Nordenfelkt v Maxim Nordenfelt Gun  Co Ltd [1894]AC 535. 
90 Napier v National Business Agency [1951] 2 All ER 263; see also Howard v 
Shirlstar Container Transport Ltd  [1991] 1WLR 1292. 
91 For “The Legal Character” of Article VIII (2) (b) see Proctor, supra, para 15.04-
15.08 pp 373-376. 
92  For “The Offences created by the 1947 Act “ see Proctor, C, ibid,  para 14.08-14.14 
pp 62-364; and for Personal and Territorial Ambit” see para 14.1, 5 pp 364-5  
93  [1966] 3 All ER 785.  
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was that the plaintiff had agreed with him to deliver to him rupees’ cheque in 
consideration for the defendant’s delivering to the plaintiff the £300 cheque 
sued on; the object of the transactions, as the plaintiff well knew, was to enable 
Latif to take money out of Pakistan contrary to Pakistan exchange currency 
regulations and they were illegal in that they had that illegal object and /or were 
contrary to public policy.  
The court decided that there was nothing illegal in the cheque’s transaction 
in that it took place wholly in England, and found for the plaintiff. Referring to 
the Bretton Woods Agreements Act 1945 and the Order in Council, Art VIII, s 
2(b), the appeal was dismissed. However, there were other background 
information that swayed the decision in the Sharif and Azad case. The 
distinguishing factors being, first, that the rupees were placed into a blocked 
account in Pakistan and not paid to Latif; secondly the action was on a cheque, 
not a letter of credit. This should be contrasted with Batra v Ebrahim94 where it 
was held, when the point was taken for the first time, that Art. VIII s 2(b)95 
applied. Accordingly, the two contracts by each of which the plaintiff, an 
Indian living in England, agreed to pay cheques in sterling to the defendant, 
another Indian also living in England, and the defendant agreed to pay in 
exchange Indian rupees in India to him for his benefit when he went to India, 
contrary to the Indian foreign exchange regulations, where exchange contracts 
offending against Art VIII s 2(b) are unenforceable in England for that reason. 
These two almost identical cases gave rise to contrasting judgments. The 
only distinguishing factors are that Sharif‘s decision depended on its special 
facts. With regard to fraud exception Sharif decision revolved around the law 
applicable to cheques and should not be applied to credit. So transactions 
within England in contravention of exchange regulations of a foreign power are 
not illegal and are therefore unenforceable under English common law. This 
was not the scenario of the American Accord. In arriving at its decision the 
courts also provided analogies concerning contracts contravening domestic and 
foreign legislations.  
 
(iii) Contracts (other than exchange contracts) contrary to domestic English 
legislation. 
 
In arriving at its judgment the Appeal Court also considered cases in 
contravention of domestic legislation or other exchange controls or letters of 
credit. First, in Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd v Terruzzi,96 the court decided that 
contracts for the sale and purchase of metals between brokers on the London 
94  [177] Court of Appeal Transcript  197 B. 
95 For “The Scope and Interpretation of Article VIII(2)(b)”,  see Proctor, supra, paras 
15.12-15-35 pp 378-407. 
96  [1976] 1 All ER 817. 
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Metal Exchange and a dealer in Italy, who entered into them in breach of the 
Italian Exchange Control Regulations, were legitimate sales contracts and, 
though involving the currency of Italy, were not contracts to exchange one 
currency for another and were therefore enforceable by the brokers. According, 
as they were not exchange contracts, Art VIII s 2(b) had no application. 
Secondly, the Terruzi decision should be contrasted with Ralli Brothers v 
Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar 97 where in an allied but distinct principle the 
courts decided that they would not enforce a contract in a foreign country if 
performance had become illegal by laws of that country. Aznar involved 
English chaterers of Spanish shipowners to carry cargo from Calcutta to 
Barcelona at £50 per ton; a supervening Spanish Decree put the freight ceiling 
to 875 pesetas (slightly less than £50 at the then exchange rate). In a claim by 
the owners for recovery of the full freight, the court held that they could not 
recover the excess. Thirdly, in Ragazzoni v K Sethia 1944) Ltd.,98 the courts 
refused to enforce a contract for the purchase of jute from India for resale in 
South Africa when the parties knew that the exporting of jute from India to 
South Africa was prohibited by Indian law. And finally, in Foster v Driscoll99 
the court refused any relief to the parties to an agreement to sell whisky in the 
US in contravention of the prohibition laws. 
These decisions are nevertheless distinguishable from the American Accord 
for a number of reasons. First, although contravening local legislation they 
were not exchange contracts. Secondly, they did not revolve around letters of 
credit, although they might have been used for payments therein. Furthermore, 
the transaction in Ralli Brothers was not illegal ab initio; it only subsequently 
became so whereas in the American Accord, Sharif and Betram, they were 
illegal from start. So once again we are not any wiser as to why these cases 
were cited in the judgment except, perhaps, to demonstrate the difference 
between contracts in contravention of domestic legislation compared to those 
against. The courts then moved on another common law doctrine: severability 
of contracts 
 
(b) On Severability of the Sales and Exchange Contracts 
 
(i) Application of the Principle of Severability in Contracts 
 
In reviewing sales contract from exchange contract, the aim in the 
American Accord was to see whether the legal (goods transaction) part of the 
contract for which value had been received (sales contract) from the illegal 
(monetary transactions) part involving transfer of currency for which no value 
97 [1920] 2 KB 287. 
98 [1957] 3 All ER 286. 
99 [1929] 1 KB 470. 
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had been received (exchange contract). Unfortunately in the process, the courts 
without any rationale got themselves muddled with the issue of severable 
contracts.100 At common law where a contract is severable, a breach may be 
found to constitute a default as to only the specific part breached, thus relieving 
the defaulting party from liability for damages for breach of contract. This is 
the case both under English and American Law.101 However, according to Lord 
Diplock, above,102 it was not strictly accurate to talk of severability in the 
American Accord. Rather, he thought that the task of the Court was to penetrate 
any disguise to identify any monetary transactions which the words intended to 
conceal and to refuse to enforce the contract to the extent that to do so would 
give effect to the monetary transaction. On this point, the Court of Appeal and 
the House of Lords both agreed that the seller was entitled to judgment for that 
part of the relevant instalment (i.e. sales contract) which was not a monetary 
transaction in disguise. This aspect of the House of Lords judgment is 
interesting for the following reasons. 
First, it provides a clear authority for the narrow or restrictive interpretation 
of “exchange contract” and the difference in the Anglo-American and 
European jurisprudence.103 Although there is some European support for the 
wider or liberal interpretation,104 the American courts have favoured the narrow 
approach and this can be justified by the referenced to “currency” rather than 
“exchange resources” in the Order.105 Secondly, the House of Lords 
uncharacteristically supported Lord Denning’s approach in the Terruzzi case of 
looking to the substance and not the form of the contract-the liberal approach. 
It will be remembered that this equitable approach was adopted by Lord 
Denning in reliance on Nussbaum’s,106 where he referred to “monetary 
transactions in disguise.” Lord Diplock also adopts the phrase but for some 
reason appears to attribute it to Lord Denning. Thirdly, the House of Lords 
100 For severable contracts at common law see, the case of Nicolene Ltd v Simmonds 
[1953] 1 QBD 543. 
101 For the US see the Uniform Commercial Code Para 2-612 especially with respect to 
instalment contracts. See also the case of Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc v Cohan, 2 
Wash App 703, 469 P2d 574, 578, 582 with respect to severability Clause, Severability 
Doctrine. 
102 See Note 78 supra. 
103 For an early interpretation of this provision by the Executive Board of Director of 
the IMF   see (1954) 3ICLQ 262. 
104 See F A Mann, The Legal Aspects of Money, (4th edn) 383 et seq where he cites 
German cases. However, in a later edition (5th Edn, 1992, Clarendon Press, Oxford) of 
the book Mann is very critical of the American Accord decision, see p 375. 
105 See  Banco Do Brasil, SA v Israel Commodity Co 239 NYS 2d 872, 874 and J Zeevi 
& Sons Ltd v Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd 371 NYS 2d 892, 900. 
106 Supra at 427. 
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adopted what Lord Denning MR said about the meaning of “unenforceable.”107 
In that case Lord Denning said that it did not make the contract illegal. He 
opined that the word should be interpreted to promote the general legislative 
purpose which here meant that the court itself must take the point. In so doing 
Lord Denning was continuing his wider interpretation approach for which he 
was well known. 
Fourthly, the House of Lords, like the Court of Appeal, disagreed with 
Mocatta J, who at the trial stage held that the whole documentary credit was 
“tarred with same brush.” The appellate courts held that only the part of the 
amount which represented the monetary transaction in disguise was so tainted. 
This was probably the only ground on which the two upper courts agreed. On 
the other hand this simply meant that it would not be enforced by the courts but 
not that it is illegal. Upon this reasoning, the confirming bank could have 
resisted payment of that part but there was nothing to prevent it under English 
law from paying out voluntarily.108 However, one would go one stage further 
and suggest, as Mocatta J did, that the whole contract was tarnished and 
therefore should have been declared illegal and unenforceable. Lord Denning in 
the Court of Appeal approached it from this policy perspective. To decide 
otherwise would have been harsh as it would have deprived sellers for value 
provided and the assignees (bona fide purchasers or holders in due course). It is 
probably this consideration, more than anything else that swayed the House of 
Lords. 
This English law approach is different from that of American law and is 
inconsistent with the principle of the autonomy of the documents to which they 
had given primacy on the documentary credit front.109 In the American case of 
J Zeevi & Sons Ltd v Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd.,110 which does not appear 
to have been cited, the New York Court of Appeal, adopting the narrow view, 
held that a letter of credit was not an exchange contract.111 It is, however, 
difficult to see why not.  Besides that case was really on discrimination rather 
than fraud in credit transactions which arguably falls outside the fraud 
exception rule anyway. Be that as it may, both the trial court and the House of 
Lords were wrong to delve into these irrelevances and at such length.  First, the 
issues of severance were not pleaded by the plaintiff at the lower levels. 
Secondly, on the basis of the above arguments it was unnecessary for courts to 
delve into those issues. It was irrelevant whether severance was applicable 
because the whole object was to transfer foreign currency in contravention of 
107 In an unreported case of Batra v Ebrahim [1977]  Court of Appeal Transcript 197B. 
108 [1982] 2 All ER at 730 g-h. 
109  See American case of Stechy; F.A Mann, supra, at 391.  
110  371 NYS 2d 892. 
111  For a strong criticism of the case, see, John S Williams, Cornell LJ, Vol 9 (1975) 
239 at p 243. 
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Peruvian Exchange Control Regulations and once that was proved then the 
claim was untenable. It is not that the doctrine is irrelevant under common law 
but rather not one to be used, as in this case, to aid the parties. Could the third, 




(ii) Validity of the application of Equitable Doctrine Approach 
 
In addition to unenforceability for reasons of illegality and the doctrine of 
severance, all considered, the trial court and the House of Lords were of the 
view that it would be inequitable to deny the seller and their assignees the 
benefits of the sales contract portion of the transaction for which goods had 
been supplied and received by the buyers. The courts asked themselves whether 
it would be fair and just and in accordance with the rules of equity112 to hold 
otherwise. Thus, the general approach of the two courts seemed to have been 
more reminiscent of the common law equitable doctrine of severance and 
would appear to allow the courts more scope than would the common law. 
Their Lordships clearly felt that there was no illegality and that as between 
the parties one was more to blame than the other but that not all should suffer. 
However, to benefit at equity a party seeking equitable remedy should have 
“clean hands” and clearly none of the parties (accept perhaps the assignee) in 
the American Accord had “clean hands” and therefore neither should have 
benefited from the contract. Although not proven as his act, the seller knew of, 
and benefited from, the alteration of the date on the bill of lading. It would not 
be surprising if he had a part in it. On the over invoicing, Stephen LJ lifted the 
veil, so to speak, above, when he opined that, “the sellers knew exactly what 
the buyers were up to. They went along with it for no other motives than greed. 
There was no evidence that there was any undue pressure or duress exerted on 
them. They did not come forward and if the bank itself had not discovered the 
fraud the pair of them would have got away with it.”113  But then equity is in 
the realm of the discretion of the judges and cannot be questioned. Thus, 
although neither of the parties “prayed”, the judges had the discretion to raise 
the matter.  
112 Originating from the Latin word aequus meaning fair and encapsulating impartiality 
and natural justice, it is a body of rules existing by the side of the original civil law, 
founded on distinct principles and claiming incidentally to supersede the civil law in 
virtue of a superior sanctity inherent in those principles, and, a system of doctrines and 
procedures which developed side by side with the common law and statute law , having 
originated in the doctrines and procedures evolved by the Court of Chancery in its 
attempts to remedy some of the defects of the common law. 
113 [1981] 3 All ER 142.  
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The American Accord also dealt with wider trade and financial matters 
such as over-invoicing in international trade and foreign exchange regulations, 






FINANCIAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
(a) On Over/Under Invoicing and Foreign Currency Exchange Controls 
Regulations. 
 
(i) Over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports and the WTO 
Agreement. 
 
The American Accord also dealt with some interesting points of private and 
public international law relating to currency exchange or exchange controls, 
i.e., domestic legislation placing limits on the holding, trading or other use of 
foreign currency.114 The transaction violated the Peruvian Exchange Control 
Regulations. By Article 1 of the Peruvian Decree Law 18275 of 15 May 1970, 
“From the date hereafter it [was] prohibited for individuals or corporations 
resident in Peru, with the exception of Banco Central de Reserva del Peru and 
Banco de la Nacion, to maintain or establish deposits in a foreign currency in 
banks and other institutions in this country and/or abroad.” By Article 18 of the 
same Law,  “it [was] an offence of fraud against the State to maintain foreign 
currency or to perform any type of operation prohibited by this Decree Law”, 
and more importantly by Article 7 of Decree Law 18891 of 17 June 1971, “The 
over-valuing of imports and obligations payable in a foreign country, as well as 
the under-valuing of exports, in violation of what [was] provided for in the 
Foreign Currency Certificates Regulations, [constituted] the offence of fraud 
damaging to the State. Any offence referred to in the previous paragraph [was 
to be] penalised as stated in Article 19 of Decree Law 18275.” 
First, is the issue of exchange control generally.  Exchange controls are 
often imposed by a government, mostly of developing countries, faced with 
balance of payments deficits or a currency not easily convertible into other 
currencies. This is normally achieved by the Central Bank or Finance Ministry 
114 Measures are normally taken to ration or prohibit dealings in hard currencies 
especially in developing countries with balance of payments problems, see Gold, J, The 
Fund Agreements in Courts 54, and Gold J, The Fund Agreement in Courts, Parts VIII-
XI 43 et seq. 
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passing a law regulating foreign currency trading and determining how foreign 
exchange is spent usually by issuing exchange permits for foreign exchange. 
Often traders who have either exhausted their quota or are greedy tend to resort 
to other means, such as over invoicing of imports or under invoicing of exports, 
to have access to foreign currency. This is made possible by an overseas buyer 
or seller’s collusion. Reasons for control range from stemming an overrun on 
the economy to petty nationalism.  
The general principle of English private international law is that exchange 
control legislation of a foreign country will be enforced where the object is to 
protect the economy of that country. The only exception to the principle seems 
to be where the exchange control in the foreign country is used as an 
instrument of oppression or discrimination.115 Reasons for Peruvian 
Regulations were neither given nor were they relevant. No oppression or 
discrimination was pleaded or alleged in the American Accord, thus, it was 
immaterial. The relief would not be available in that case. 
Secondly, is the status of exchange controls under English law. Although 
the practice is known to common law, it had not come before an English court 
until this case. Neither had it come altogether in combination with a credit 
transaction. The principle is founded both in common law, comity and 
enforcement of international obligations resulting from Agreements, 
Conventions and Treaties. It will be remembered that the Bretton Woods 
Agreement which set up the IMF and the World Bank is consistent with both 
the principle and its exceptions. The courts should have had the courage to deal 
with it as a new situation. Instead they (the courts) allowed that portion which, 
in their opinion, did not violate the Peruvian Exchange Control Regulations. 
The whole transaction should have been disallowed as tainted. 
  
(ii) The meaning of “Oppression” and “Discrimination” in the IMF 
Agreement and foreign exchange control regulations. 
 
It will be remembered that one of the exceptions to enforcement, by 
English courts, of foreign exchange controls regulations is where it would be 
oppressive and their Lordships agreed on the general principles of English 
private international law that exchange control legislation of a foreign country 
will be enforced where the object is to protect the economy but not where it is 
used as an instrument of oppression or discrimination.  However, it is not clear 
what the courts meant by “oppression” and “discrimination” in this respect. 
Was the aim to stop a State oppressing or discriminating against its own 
citizens or citizens of another country? A type of national treatment perhaps! 
There was no guidance from the decision on the nature and extent of the 
115  On this point see discussions on the next sub-paragraph immediately below. 
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subject. However, in ordinary context “oppression”116 and discrimination”117 
should be assigned their natural meanings. In legal contexts oppression118 and 
discrimination119 mean almost the same. It is, however, unclear whether what 
the economic meanings of the two terms are.  
However, we get the clue from a number of other sources. First, from 
Mann who says, “Yet it would seem that, although exchange control 
regulations as a whole may be maintained consistently with the Fund 
Agreement, certain of their specific effects may be such as to require or permit 
the refusal to apply them in a given case on the grounds of public policy. This 
may occur when their application may be discriminatory or penal in character 
or otherwise obnoxious. There is nothing in the Fund Agreement that would 
compel the Courts in a given case to reach decisions which are offensive to 
their sense of justice; they are precluded only from ignoring Member State’s 
exchange control regulations as a matter of principle or of a priori reasoning. It 
is likely that such is the rationale underlying an important, but not altogether 
clear, decision of the Dutch Hoge Raad, which rejected Indonesian exchange 
control regulations. Public policy ought to have been and perhaps was one of 
the reasons why the New York Court of Appeals in Zeevi v Grindlays Bank  
disregarded Ugandan exchange control restrictions: ‘As typified by strong anti-
Israel and anti-semitic suggestions made by Uganda’s President to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations’, the Bank of Uganda purported to 
cancel all payments to Israel companies such as the plaintiffs and the defendant 
relied on those cancellations, described by the Court as ‘confiscatory and 
discriminatory  acts of the Ugandan Government’, to avoid liability under an 
irrevocable letter of credit validly opened before the date of the directive; this 
surely was contrary to ordre public and could not afford a defence.”120
116 From the word to oppress meaning, “to treat with tyrannical cruelty or injustice”  
Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, 1979 Edition p 924 column 2,  W&R 
Chambers Ltd,  Edinburgh. 
117  Generally meaning to treat unfairly differently, Ibid at p 369 column 1. 
118 “The exercise of authority or power in a burdensome, harsh or wrongful manner, 
unjust or cruel treatment of subjects, inferiors; the imposition of unreasonable or unjust 
burdens”: OED Definition adopted in R v Fulling [1987] QB 426. “Oppression includes 
torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, and the use of or threat of violence (whether 
or not amounting to torture)”: P & CEA 1984 S 76(8); see also R v Ismail [1990] Crim 
LR 109; R v Beales [1991] CLR 118 
119 This is the according of some differential treatment to persons or bodies in the same 
position, eg sex, racial or nationality. Discrimination on the grounds of nationality is 
prohibited in international by the national treatment principle and in the EU Article 7 of 
the Treaty of Rome 1957. 
120 Mann, FA, The Legal Aspects of Money (5th Edn, 1992, Clarendon Press Oxford) p 
369. In addition to Zeevi case, Mann cites Dallal v Iran and Bank Mellat, Int LR 75, 
126, at p 149 where Justice Holtzman quoted this sentence with approval- but cf Dallal 
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Secondly, from the WTO Agreement on PSI121 which codified the non-
discrimination requirements in its regulations on double invoicing practices 
which extends obligations to legislate the requirements to importing and 
exporting countries when implementing the Agreement.122 Thirdly, and finally, 
the Bretton Woods Agreement itself which set up the IMF is also consistent 
with this principle123 of eliminating oppression and discrimination in foreign 
currency allocations. This was contained in the Bretton Woods Agreement 
Order in Council 1946124 made under the Bretton Woods Agreement Act 1945 
to give effect to the Bretton Woods Agreement in the UK. to policy 
considerations.  
This article also asserts that on fraud exception in credit transactions the 
American Accord decision is representative of common law and Anglo-
American jurisprudence approach. 
 
(iii) Policy Considerations in fraud exception decisions 
 
From the above analysis of the American Accord and decisions before and 
after it, there appears to be no logical conclusions that be drawn. It is submitted 
that the overriding principle was policy rather than purely legal considerations. 
 
v Bank Mellat, [1986] 1All ER 239, at p 250 where Hobhouse J said that the majority 
had decided the principle issue ‘in somewhat idiosyncratic manner’; Nederlands 
Tijdschrift vor Internationaal Recht (The Dutch Hoge Raad case), 13 (1966), 69 Int LR 
40(1970) 7, where the court said that Art VIII (2)(b) was no obstacle to an assignment 
in contravention of Indonesian regulations, because Bretton Woods is “intended solely 
for the regular financial relations between States.” Man also thought that “It may well 
be that the plaintiff in Masouri v Singh, [1986] 1 WLR 1393 could have invoked public 
policy”, ibid at p 369. This quotation also appear in the 6th Edition of the book,  Mann 
on the Legal Aspects of Money, (2005 Oxford University Press)  by Proctor, Charles 
(Foreword  by Mann D (son of Mann FA)) pp 377-378; For “Public Policy under the 
IMF Agreement” see para15.09-15.13 pp 376-378 (2005 Oxford University Press). 
121 For the WTO Agreement on PSI, see Note 2, supra. 
122 “User Members shall ensure that preshipment inspection activities are carried out in 
a non-discriminatory manner, and that the procedures are criteria employed in the 
conduct of these activities are objective and are applied on an equal basis to all 
exporters affected by these activities. They shall ensure uniform performance of 
inspection by all the inspectors of the preshipment inspection entities contracted or 
mandated by them”- Non-discrimination,  Art. 2(1) of the WTO Agreement on 
Preshipment Inspection of Goods in International Trade. Other clauses 3(1) on non-
discrimination and Article 1(5-8) and (3(2) on transparency.  
123 Cf. the US Supreme Court case of Kolovrat v Oregon 366 US 187. 
124  Made under the Bretton Woods Agreements Order in Council 1945, s3.  
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This author has put forward this argument before125 that in these cases  courts 
have been more concerned with preserving the basis upon which the letter of 
credit and therefore international payment system works: the credibility of the 
banking system. As early as the Sztejn decision in 1941, Shietang J, after citing 
many cases, gave a glimpse to what was to follow when he said, “It is well 
established that a letter of credit is independent of the primary contract of sale 
between the buyer and the seller. The issuing bank agrees to pay upon 
presentation of documents, not goods. This rule is necessary to preserve the 
efficacy of the letter of credit as an instrument for the financing of international 
trade.”126 Although there are arguments for against policy considerations in 
judgments, it appears they (the courts) seem to be more concerned with the 
effect that derogation of such principle, such as the fraud exception, might 
have. A similar sentiment can be gathered from Jenkins J’s statement in Hamza 
Mallas that, “the opening of a confirmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain 
between the banker and the vendor of goods which imposes on the banker an 
absolute obligation to pay, irrespective of any dispute which there may be 
between the parties on the question whether the goods are up to contract or not. 
An elaborate commercial system has been built up on the footing that bankers’ 
confirmed credits are of that character, and, in my judgment, it would be wrong 
for this court in the present case to interfere with the established practice.”127  
Megarry J reiterated similar views in Discount Records where he noted 
that, “I would be slow to interfere with bankers’ irrevocable credits and not 
least in the sphere of international banking, unless a sufficiently grave cause is 
show: for intervention by the courts that are too ready or too frequent might 
gravely impair the reliance which, quite properly, is placed on such credits.”128 
Similar concern was also expressed by Kerr J in Harbottle where he noted that 
irrevocable obligations are the “lifeblood of international commerce”129 and 
that once the merchants had come to an agreement and had assumed the risk 
commensurate with the wording of their guarantee, the machinery and 
commitments of the banks “must be allowed to be honoured, free from 
interference by the courts. Otherwise, trust in international commerce would be 
irreparably damaged.”130 Likewise, in State Trading Corporation of India, 
Lord Denning MR obiter dictared that, “I may say that performance bonds 
125 See generally, Ademun-Odeke, “The Judicial Approach to Injunctions in Letters of 
Credit and Performance Bond Transactions: The Fraud Exception Re-examined”,  
Denning LJ, 1995, pp 35-65. 
126 Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corporation (1941) 31 NYS 2d 631 at 634. 
127 Hamza Mallas [1958] 1All ER 262  at p 263. 
128 Discount Records v Barclays Bank [1975]  All ER p 1075. 
129 R D  Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd  v National Westminster Bank [1977] 2 All ER 862 
at 870. 
130 Ibid. 
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fulfil a most useful role in international trade… The courts must see that these 
performance bonds are honoured.”131  There have been other dicta and 
pronouncements on letters of credits and performance bonds (which are treated 
the same) with or without fraud allegations where courts in refusing relief have 
stressed the importance of preserving confidence in the credit and bond 
mechanisms. For instance, in Power Curber International Ltd v National Bank 
of Kuwait SAK, Lord Denning MR, returned to the theme more emphatically, 
thus, “If the court of any of the countries should interfere with the obligations 
of one of its banks (by ordering it not to pay under a letter of credit) it would 
strike at the very heart of that country’s international trade. No foreign seller 
would supply goods to that country on letters of credit because he could no 
longer be confident of being paid. No trader would accept a letter of credit 
issued by a bank of that country if it might be ordered by its courts not to 
pay.”132  Policy considerations are also used to protect bonafide purchasers or 
holders in due course as was the case in Discount Records where Lord Denning 
refused injunctive relief to the applicant since at that time the bill of exchange 
drawn against the credit will have probably passed to an innocent third party 
and that if the purpose of the injunction was to deny the seller the proceeds of 
the fraud, the granting of the injunction would not achieve that objective. 
Furthermore it must be remembered that these instruments were developed 
and used by the banks for their own purpose. If they suffer under their 
instruments then be it. However, it cannot be forgotten also that in this respect 
English courts probably have in mind   preserving the position of the UK 
London and as a leading international trade and finance centre and nation, 
respectively, supported by loyally and obedient judicial, arbitral, shipping and 
insurance system. It would be unnatural if they didn’t. 
 
WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE “AMERICAN ACCORD” 
DECISION 
 
(a) In the light of the WTO Agreement on PSI 
 
It would be difficult to determine the possible (alternative) outcome of the 
American Accord were it to have been decided a decade later following 
conclusion of the WTO Agreement PSI, to which both the UK and Peru are 
Parties.133  
131  State Trading Corporation of India Ltd v E D & Man  (Sugar) [1981] Com LR 235.   
132 [1981] 3 All ER 607 at 613. 
133 The Agreement deals with over-invoicing and under-invoicing and allows for pre-
shipment inspection of shipment details- essentially price, quantity and, quality of 
goods ordered overseas. Used by governments of especially developing countries, the 
purpose is to safeguard national financial interests (prevention of capital flight and 
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PSI is important for the countries that participate in it for a number of 
reasons. It is used: (a) by governments of developing countries to compensate 
for any inadequacies in the administrative infrastructures; (b) as a way of 
preventing commercial fraud using shipping, banking or insurance documents; 
(c) to eliminate customs duty evasions and thereby raising or saving any 
revenues by the practice of non-declaration or misclassification of goods by 
eliminating over-invoicing, under-invoicing and; (d) for conservation and 
avoidance of capital flight by eliminating the practice of over invoicing and 
under invoicing and to ensure foreign currency is used for essential functions; 
(e) to provide exporters and importers with extra confidence that the goods 
match what is specified in the sales; (f) to verify and conform to the rules of 
origin of the goods; (g) for monitoring of compliance with national regulations; 
(h) to provide data for statistical purposes; (i) to provide price data for a 
customs valuation data base; (j) for technical assistance, technology transfer 
and training; (k) to monitor donor funds and foreign exchange replenishment; 
(l) to facilitate trade by eliminating delay caused by having to check goods on 
arrival and the customs process; and (m) to protect consumers. 
Defined broadly,134 the WTO Agreement PSI has been made mandatory for 
all importable goods except those exempted by about 40-50 developing 
countries in Africa,135 Asia,136 Latin America137 and the Caribbean138 who use 
the system to: combat money-laundering, fight against international organised 
 
commercial fraud as well as customs duty evasion, for instance) to compensate for 
inadequacies in administrative infrastructures-the very objectives that IMF and 
Peruvian Exchange Regulations sought to promote. Prior to the Agreement no national 
or international instrument had dealt with the subject. 
134 “ Pre-shipment inspection activities are all activities relating to the verification of 
the quality, the quantity, the price, including currency exchange rate and finance terms, 
and/or the customs classification of goods to be exported to the territory of the user 
Member”   Article 1(3), WTO Agreement on Preshipment Inspections. 
135 Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Condo (Democratic Republic), Congo (Republic of ), 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Tanzania (excluding Zanzibar), Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zanzibar( 
although part of the United Republic of Tanzania which includes the Island of 
Zanzibar, Zanzibar has separate PSI programmes. Mainland Tanzania has an exclusive 
contract with COTECNA covering customs, while Zanzibar has one with SGS 
covering foreign exchange) and Zimbabwe. 
136 Bangladeshi, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Philippines and Uzbekistan. 
137 Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru , and Suriname. 
138  Haiti. 
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crime and global terrorism.139 Thus PSI is now used as a world-wide economic 
programme for the monitoring of imports into developing countries. It has a 
positive impact on the national budget, terms of trade, balance of payments and 
general economic development of the PSI participating countries. For the 
purposes of the American Accord, objectives (b), (c), (d), (f), (j) and (k) are 
particularly relevant to this analysis. Major trading nations such as the UK have 
interest in the success of the Agreement especially in relation to those in the 
enumerated paragraphs. Therefore, a court ruling such as that of the American 
Accord today would greatly undermine the WTO Agreement on PSI and 
developing countries’ efforts to restructure their economies and to eliminate 
money laundering and other types of documentary frauds in international trade. 
It would provide comfort for money launderers and therefore serve as a Crooks 
Charter. 
 
(b) Crooks’ Charter for Money Laundering and other Documentary 
Frauds!? 
 
It is not the aim or intention of this analysis to go into detail on money 
laundering and related activities.140 Rather the argument is that the decision, 
including those before and after it, except Beam Technologies, would be a 
crooks’ charter for money-launderers. If all that they would incur is the 
minimum inconvenience arising from severability of contracts then that is a 
small price to pay. Most money laundering contracts are in fact clothed in the 
same way as the letter of credit contract. If as in the American Accord, courts 
are not prepared to confront them they will thrive especially at international 
financial centres such as London. Retaining London’s international position is 
one thing but making it a soft spot for money launderers is quite another. It has 
been suggested further that, “International trading companies are known to be 
one of the high risk business areas which lend themselves more readily to 
potential criminal activities than others”;141 apparently “---because the 
mechanism of the documentary credit system provides a perfect vehicle for 
money launderers to launder their criminal proceeds.”142 This would be a 
natural conclusion since those criminal activities combine the cycle of money 
laundering itself, placement (cash deposits, wire transfers or other means to 
place proceeds of crime into accounts of traders/importers/buyers), layering 
(conversion of cash into letters of credit) and integration (using letter of credit 
139 Elimination of money-laundering, fight against international organised crime and 
international terrorism were not among the reasons given for PSI. However, in view of 
recent developments they would be legitimate additions to the functions of PSI. 
140 For details on Money Laundering and related activities see Note 47, supra. 
141 Anonymous Author, Fraud in Documentary Credit Transactions, supra, p 1 
142 Ibid. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
148 
                                                     
transactions to disguise the illicit proceeds and allowing the laundered funds to 
be disbursed back to the criminal or using illicit funds to repay banks for pre-
trade finance facilities) into one operation.  
Like money laundering itself, detailed treatment of white collar crime is 
also outside the scope of this article.143  However, the implications of the 
decision in the American Accord would clearly provide a licence to violate UK 
international obligations, such as the IMF and other Agreements, in a number 
of ways. First, it is of no consequence that such laws are based on common law 
principles of comity or agreements signed and ratified by the UK. Secondly, it 
disregards other countries legislation, as in this case the Peruvian Exchange 
Control Regulations. Thirdly and as constantly argued, in addition to money-
laundering, it would be a license for money launderers to use the letter of credit 
for such purposes.144 By turning a blind eye and deaf ears to these issues, 
English courts would be abdicating their responsibility to provide judicial 
supervision.145
 
(c) Abdication of Judicial Supervisory duties 
 
Despite the crucial role of letters of credit in international trade and 
finance, courts should not lose their supervisory functions. Shientang J, himself 
said that, “the principle of the independence of the bank’s obligations under the 
letter of credit should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller.”146 
This was echoed by the New York Supreme Court decision already cited.147 
Stephenson LJ also opined that, “But I do not think that the courts have a duty 
to assist international trade to run smoothly if it is fraudulent any more than 
when it violates and international agreement. Banks trust beneficiaries to 
present honest documents; if beneficiaries go to others (as they have to) for the 
documents they present, it is important to all concerned that those documents 
should accord not merely with the requirements of the credit but with the facts, 
143 For these and money laundering see generally see Note 47 and 138, supra. 
144 In addition to the handicap imposed by the autonomy principle and the 
independence of documents, art 3(a) and art. 15 of the UCP, the practical problem to 
the banks is that the documents stipulated under a letter of credit are usually received 
by the bank from a single source, ie, the beneficiary. These documents may be prepared 
by the beneficiary himself (such as the inspection certificate in Beams Technologies) 
and may involve fraudulent situations. 
145 See, John Walker, “How Big is Global Money Laundering”, Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, Vol No 1 (1999); and generally Wheble, B.S (1993) 
“Documentary Fraud in International Trade-Whose Fault, Whose Responsibility?” ICC 
International Maritime Bureau. 
146 Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Bank, supra, at p 634. 
147 South Western Shipping Corporation v National City Bank of New York (1959) 6 
NY 2d 454 . 
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and if they do not because of the intention of anyone concerned with them to 
deceive I see no good reason when the choice is between two innocent parties 
putting the loss on the beneficiary, not the bank or its customer.”148 Griffiths LJ 
added his views, thus, “ The deal …involved two agreements: first the 
agreement for the purchase of the machinery, and, second, a collateral 
agreement by which the Glass Fibres agreed to provide an inflated invoice and 
to collect dollars on behalf of the Peruvian company through the letter of credit 
and remit  them to the bank in Miami. The sole purpose of the second 
agreement was to enable the Peruvian company to exchange Peruvian soles for 
dollars in breach of the Peruvian exchange control regulations; it was the 
device by which an exchange contract was disguised by inflating the invoice to 
make it appear all part of the commercial transaction for the purchase of 
machinery. It was precisely the type of agreement that Professor Nussbaum 
calls ‘monetary transaction in disguise’149 and which Lord Denning MR in 
Wilson v Smithett and Cope Ltd v Terruzi150 said would be an exchange 
contract within art. viii, s 2(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement and made a 
part of our own domestic law by the Bretton Woods Agreement Order in 
Council 1946. His Lordship continued that, “-- but in this case the court is not 
dealing with a letter of credit that has been opened solely to pay for goods 
under a sale contract, nor is it dealing with a dispute between buyer and seller 
under the sale contract. The facts reveal that the buyer and the seller have 
conspired together to use the letter of credit as a means of giving effect to an 
exchange contract in breach of the foreign exchange regulations of Peru. Is the 
court to refuse to recognise the reality of the situation and allow effect to be 
given to the exchange contract because it sits in blinkers looking at the letter of 
credit in isolation? I find nothing in any of the decisions dealing with letters of 
credit that leads to this conclusion. They do no more than establish that the 
bank is not concerned with possible breaches of the underlying sales 
contract.”151 Significantly, and finally the learned Lord Justice was prepared to 
be bold and gamble by dissenting departure, “I have, after some hesitation, 
concluded that this case does not bind me to follow a course of action which 
would, I think, do a grave disservice to the obligations that this country 
accepted as party to the Bretton Woods Agreement. As Lord Denning MR 
pointed out in Batra v Ebrahim152 [the court itself was under a duty to take the 
point of unenforceability under the 1946 Order in Council irrespective of the 
wishes of the parties to the litigation. In my opinion the court should not shirk 
its duty by turning its back on the reality of the situation. Once it sees that the 
148 [1981] 1 All ER at 161. 
149 (1949) Yale LJ 421 at 427). 
150 [1976] 1 All ER 817 at 823 , [1976] QB 683 at 714. 
151 Ibid . 
152 [1977] Court of Appeal Transcript, 197B. 
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real purpose of the letter of credit is in part to give effect to an exchange 
contract in breach of the Peruvian exchange control regulations the court 
should refuse its assistance and decline to give judgment for such part of the 
claim that relates to the exchange control.”153  Thus, for once a learned judge 
was prepared to break ranks with the others and with precedence to examine 
wider views and probably to appreciate the reality of the matter. He was to be 
joined much later by Justice Chao Hick Tin in Beam Technologies. 
 
 
(d) Revision of the UCP 500: the UNCITRAL Model and the UCC 
approaches 
 
(i) Revision of the UCP 
 
In addition to the strict interpretation of English and other common law 
courts on the fraud exception the other problem is failure by the UCP to-date to 
tackle the problem of fraud head on. It has been suggested in this article that 
that failure has provided comfort to money launderers, documentary fraudsters 
and other white collar crimes. There is no provision for fraud in the UCP to 
balance the autonomy principle contained in article 3 thereon. This and other 
existing articles do not address or elaborate on the rights and obligations of the 
various parties involved in the letter of credit transactions in the event of fraud. 
The doctrine of strict compliance, which is one of the fundamental doctrines in 
the letter of credit jurisprudence all over the world, is also not elaborated in the 
UCP 500.  The provisions of article 15 exonerating banks from liability or 
responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, falsification or 
legal effect of any documents is neither defence nor comfort to them when 
faced with claims however fraudulent. 
 The American Accord has demonstrated that the bank may have to pay up 
even when it knows of fraud so long as it is not committed by the seller or 
other beneficiary. Yet fraud is a real issue which exists in documentary credit 
transactions and remains a testing issue for many buyers and their banks caught 
up in this dilemma. Ellinger154 has documented the shortcomings of the UCP 
500 in its 13 year life and those of its predecessors. Avoiding the risks of 
repeating oneself, suffice to point out that among the reforms, the proposals for 
revision of the UCP, which this author shares, include: (a) improvement of  the 
desired scope of application of the UCP, (b) introduction of a new 
153 Ibid. 172. 
154 Ellinger EP “The UCP-500: considering a new revision” LM&CLQ 2004, pp 30-45; 
for his earlier contributions see: [1984] LM&CLQ 578; [1994] LMCLQ 377; The 
Tender of Fraudulent Documents under Documentary Letters of Credit (1965) 7 
Malaya Law Review, 24 at 25-26. 
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classifications of  letters of credit according to their tenor rather than the form 
assumed  by the issuing bank’s undertakings, (c) strengthening the position of 
negotiating banks  by providing more protections and clarifying the provisions 
of the UCP, (d) cleaning up the whole areas of autonomy and strict compliance, 
(e) improving the rejection procedures to give banks more time to examine and 
investigate with being assumed to have accepted the documents by default, (f) 
introduction of articles dealing with jurisdiction and the law applicable; and (g) 
introduction of a provision of arbitration clause and dispute resolutions to say 
ICC to take the heat out of the courts. It is not the courts duty to formulate any 
changes. And even if it were, with due respect, courts have developed self 
importance in themselves to be of any further meaningful changes. 
 
(iii) The UCC Approach 
 
The second or alternative way out is to adopt the parallel provision of the 
UCP in the USA, the UCC which provides a more systematic approach to 
fraud. These are. First, if a presentation is made which appears on its face 
strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the credit, but a required 
document is forged  or materially fraudulent, or honour of the presentation 
would facilitate a material fraud  by the beneficiary then (a) the issuer shall 
honour the presentation, if honour is demanded by (i) a nominated person who 
has given value in good faith and without notice of forgery or material fraud, 
(ii) a confirmer who has honoured its confirmation in good faith, (iii) a holder 
in due course of a draft drawn  under the letter of credit which was taken after 
acceptance by the issuer or nominated person or (iv) an assignee of the issuer’s 
or nominated persons deferred obligation that was taken for value and without 
notice of forgery or material fraud after the obligation was incurred by the 
issuer or nominated person, and (b) the issuer, acting in good faith, may honour 
or dishonour the presentation in any other case.   
Secondly, if the applicant claims that a required document is forged or 
materially fraudulent or that honour of the presentation would facilitate a 
material fraud by the beneficiary or the issuer or the applicant , a court of 
competent jurisdiction may temporarily or permanently enjoin the issuer from 
honouring a presentation or grant a similar relief against the issuer of other 
persons only if the courts find that (a) the relief is not is not prohibited under 
the law applicable to an acceptable draft or deferred obligation incurred by  the 
issuer, (b) a beneficiary, issuer, or nominated person who may be adversely  
affected is adequately protected against loss that it may suffer because the relief 
is granted, (c) all of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief under the law 
of this state have been met, and (d) on the basis of  the information submitted 
to the court, the applicant is more likely than not to succeed under its claim of 
forgery or material fraud and the person demanding honour does not qualify for 
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protection  under subsection (a). However, these approaches would be struck 
out in English courts as counter to the autonomy principles. 
 
(iv) The UNCTRAL Model Approach  
 
 An alternative is the UNCITRAL model on fraud. The model has two 
distinct provisions on payment obligations exception (the equivalent of fraud 
exception) and on court measures. First, on payment obligations exception 
(equivalent of the UCP fraud exception) Article 19 of the UNCITRAL 
Convention on the Independent Guarantees and Stand–by Letters of Credit 
provides as follows.155 The UNCITRAL model would be a significant 
improvement to the solution on fraud. However, as the title suggests these 
apply only to separate independent guarantees rather than to the general 
guarantees provide by the issuing bank in credits. Even if it was to come into 
155 “(1) If it is manifest and clear that: 
(a) Any document is not genuine or has been falsified: 
(b) No payment is due on the basis asserted in the demand and 
supporting documents; or  
(c) Judging by the type and purpose of the undertaking, the demand 
has no conceivable basis, the guarantor/issuer, acting on good 
faith, has a right, as against the beneficiary, to withhold 
payment. 
(2) For the purpose of subparagraph (c) of paragraph (1) of this article, 
the following are types of situations in which a demand has no 
conceivable basis: 
(a) The contingency or risk against which the undertaking was 
designed to secure the beneficiary has undoubtedly not 
materialised; 
(b) The underlying obligation of the principal / applicant has been 
declared invalid by a court or arbitral tribunal 
unless the undertaking indicates that such contingency falls 
within the risk to be covered  by the undertaking; 
(c) The underlying obligation has undoubtedly been fulfilled to the 
satisfaction of the beneficiary; 
(d) Fulfilment of the underlying obligation has clearly been 
prevented by wilful misconduct of the beneficiary; 
(e) In the case of a demand under a counter-guarantee, the 
beneficiary of the counter-guarantee has made payment in bad 
faith as guarantor /issuer of the undertaking to which the 
counter-guarantee relates. 
(3) In the circumstances set out in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of 
paragraph (1) of this article, the principal/applicant is entitled to 
provisional court measures in accordance with article 20; cf the ICC 
Rules 
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force it would have competition from the tested and tried UCP. There would 
have to be an express provision to that specifically applicable to and covering 
credit in the UCP. The long term solution therefore lies with the revision of the 
UCP  
Secondly, the model also provides for provisional court measures include 
the following provisions.156 For the same reasons as in the payment 
obligations’ exception above, this would probably run counter to the autonomy 




Beam Technologies has demonstrated that it is perhaps high time English 
courts reassessed their approach to various aspects of fraud affecting letters of 
credit and performance bond transactions by revisiting the American Accord, 
and cases before and subsequent to it. However elaborate the credit contract or 
the UCP, in the ultimate, though, and regardless of details set out in any 
standard terms and conditions such as the UCP, the construction of contractual 
terms remains in the hands of courts. Courts therefore still wield a lot of power 
which they could use for the good. 
First, with regard to the autonomy principle, courts should uphold the 
principle only in as far as is necessary to facilitate the use of the payment 
system in international trade. It should not be used as a buffer to protect 
unscrupulous beneficiaries as was the case in the decisions reviewed hereunder. 
The application of this principle regardless does not yield unpleasant results but 
156  “(1) Where, on an application by the principal/applicant or the instructing party , it 
is shown that there is a high probability that, with regard to a demand made, or 
expected to be made, by the beneficiary, one of the circumstances referred to in 
subparagraph (a), (b), and (c) of paragraph (1) of Article 19 is present, the court, on the 
basis of immediately available strong evidence, may:  
(a) Issue a provisional order to the effect that the beneficiary does not 
receive payment, including an order that the guarantor /issuer hold 
the amount of the undertaking, or 
(b) Issue a provisional order to the effect that the proceeds of the 
undertaking paid to the beneficiary are blocked, taking into account 
whether in the absence of such an order the principal/applicant would 
be likely to suffer serous harm. 
(2) The court when issuing a provisional order referred to in paragraph (1) of 
this article, may require the person applying therefore to furnish such 
form of security as the court deems appropriate. 
(3) The court may not issue a provisional order of the kind referred to in 
paragraph (1) of this article based on any objection to payment other than 
those referred to in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of paragraph (1) article 
19, or use of the undertaking for a criminal purpose.” 
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puts banks in very difficult situations where they are ‘damned if they don’t pay 
and are damned if they do’. It is understandable that courts are trying to 
protection the interest of the third party bona fide purchaser but that desire 
should be balanced against the equally legitimate interests of the buyer and his 
bank as other innocent parties. Secondly, courts should not consider the 
autonomy principle and fraud exception outside other principles such as the 
doctrine of strict compliance. In the American Accord, the requirements of the 
doctrine were not fulfilled and, if pleaded, would have protected the buyer and 
paying bank. The tender of a forged bill of lading did not constitute valid 
tender under the doctrine of strict compliance. A more liberal approach would 
have yielded alternative and correct results. Yet the doctrine of strict 
compliance, which is one of the fundamental doctrines of letters of credit law 
the world over, is not elaborated in the UCP 500, the only reference being 
art.13 (a). 
Thirdly, regarding the fraud exception it self, courts should not limit the 
exception to only fraud committed by the seller (although that is the 
commonest) but should include all frauds affecting the credit. In that context it 
was un-necessary for the court to delve into common law principles as to 
whether the contract was severable, illegal or unlawful including the equitable 
doctrine. Those were distractions from the principal issues. Fourth, courts 
(especially the House of Lords) should not have abdicated their judicial 
supervisory responsibilities. In particular they should have provided protection 
to all concerned parties to the contract. It is the courts’ duty to ensure that the 
letter of credit is not used for purposes other than that for which it was 
established. It was also imperative on the court to uphold the Bretton Woods 
system to which this country is Party and has implemented through both a 
principal and subsidiary legislation. The courts should have been brave and 
adventurous and should have adopted wider and liberal approach as adopted by   
Denning LJ, Griffiths LJ and Lane LJ above, as opposed to the narrow and 
restrictive Diplock LJ approach. 
Fifth, the decision has various other implications. One is whether the court 
would be in position to implement the WTO Agreement on PSI, one of whose 
aspects deals with over-invoicing in international trade. As a Member State, the 
UK will no doubt be implementing the Agreement in the near future. As 
already alluded to, the WTO Agreement on PSI, negotiated in the Uruguay 
Round, attempts to strike a balance between the concerns expressed by 
exporting enterprises in developed countries and the need to safeguard the 
essential interests of developing countries that consider PSI services useful. It 
is supposed to clarify that its provisions apply to PSI activities carried out in 
exporting countries, such as the UK, that are contracted or mandated by the 
governments. Sixth, another implication of the decision is that it would give 
succour to money laundering, white collar crimes and other documentary 
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frauds in international trade. Letters of credit transactions are susceptible to 
fraud and various money-laundering activities. It will be a pity if a contract 
partly of sale of goods and partly money-laundering received the same 
treatment in court as did the American Accord. On the basis and principle of 
the decision it would not be surprising if the courts sought to separate the 
unenforceable money laundering aspects from the legitimate sale of goods 
aspects if such a case came before the court today.  
Seventh, and finally, it may be advisable to follow the Singapore decision 
by adding nullity of the fraudulent documents as an exception to fraud.  The 
approach adopted by the Singapore court (above) was bold, innovative and 
courageous and merits consideration. Eighth, and finally, it is probably high 
time that the UCP is amended in its next version to include issues raised herein. 
In it its current form the UCP is quite contradictory. On the one hand it 
provides for the rules but on the other hand, by providing for the autonomy and 
doctrine of strict compliance, it ties the banks’ hands. But above all, currently 
there are no direct and clear provisions for fraud in the UCP. Nevertheless 
fraud in letters of credit is a real issue. Priority in the amendments should 
include clear provisions on fraud including the nullity exception. The fraud 
should be irrespective of which party commits or causes it. This might lead to 
litigation and a field day for lawyers but it is a small price to pay to protect 
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